Further Information on Miller's 1882 One-Time Pad by Bellovin, Steven Michael
Further Information on Miller’s 1882 One-Time Pad∗
Steven M. Bellovin






New information has been discovered about Frank Miller’s 1882 one-time pad. These
documents explain Miller’s threat model and show that he had a reasonably deep understanding
of the problem; they also suggest that his scheme was used more than had been supposed.
1 Introduction
Several years ago, I published a paper [4] describing how the one-time pad was invented by Sacra-
mento banker Frank Miller in 1882 [11], more than 35 years before its reinvention by Gilbert
Vernam and Joseph O. Mauborgne [5, 9]. Since then, I have discovered several new sources of
information about Miller’s work. Most important, I have found Miller’s own explanation for why
he created the scheme. In addition, some of the information casts doubts on my conclusion that his
work sank into instant obscurity.
2 Miller’s Explanation
The most interesting new discovery is Miller’s own explanation of the theory behind his code book,
published several months before the book itself [10]. This essay sets forth the basic principles of
operation of the scheme:
To secure secrecy the sender should have had prepared and filed with his correspondent
a list of irregular numbers, such as 483, 281, etc., etc., which numbers should neither
be repeated in any regular order, nor should the differences between them be in any
∗Note: this is a preprint copy of a paper that has been submitted for publication. The final form may vary signifi-
cantly.
regular ratio. Furthermore, when one of these numbers has been used it should always
be canceled for further use, so that the list may always show what number is next in
order for use.
Miller had two threat models in mind. First, he was concerned about book-breaking based on
probable plaintext derived from parallel telegrams:
If the possessor shall desire to telegraph, “Pay John Jones one hundred dollars,” he can
take for each of these words, except the proper nouns, the corresponding cipher word.
If the [telegraph] operator has to send at the same moment an English dispatch from
Smith to Jones, stating that an order is on the way to pay him one hundred dollars,
then is the secrecy of the cryptogram dissolved, and furthermore the operator is ready
to examine the next telegram in cipher and endeavor to ascertain if the same cipher
word is used for “Pay,” as in the first telegram. Proceeding thus, day after day, he can
detect word after word unless the owner of the code shall change his system often.
Miller was also very concerned about the integrity of messages, and in fact anticipated active
attacks:
Furthermore, such telegrams should contain passwords to satisfy the receiver that some
shrewd villain has not cut the line just out of town and woven the ends into his sur-
reptitious Morse instrument, thus enabling him to issue forged telegrams and direct
payments to a confederate.
It also seems that he felt that telegraph operators were the most likely attackers, and that some such
attacks had in fact occurred: “Great credit is due to the [telegraph] operators for their faithfulness.
Few frauds have been committed by them, although they can easily decipher such ciphers by a
little investigation.”
Miller seemed to anticipate Friedman’s argument for the absolute security of the one-time pad
compared with how a conventional cipher’s cryptanalysis can be confirmed [5, 8]: “a tentative
decipherment of a few letters in one message can be proved or disproved by the application of
the resultant key letters to the homologous letters of the other cipher message.” Miller’s take was
similar: “The detection of one telegram by means of parallel English messages will give no clue to
past or future messages” and “no dispatch shall give a clue to any other, although all the dispatches
may contain the same words.”
Finally, Miller understood the point-to-point nature of communications using a one-time pad:
“We sill suppose that ten bankers have each such a book, and that one has sent to each of the
remaining nine separate lists of ‘shift numbers,’ and that the others have followed the same plan.”
Interestingly, his article says nothing about randomness. He clearly understood the need for
non-repetition, because repetition is at the heart of the attack he describes. However, he gives us
no clue why he wrote that the “numbers should neither be repeated in regular order, nor should the
differences between them be in any regular ratio.”
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Figure 1: The extra-word list in the Library of Congress and University of Chicago library’s copies
of Miller’s book.
3 Obscurity?
In [4], I argued that it was unlikely that Miller’s system had ever seen any real use. Issues included
the lack of any provision for indicators as well as his clumsy rekeying instructions; in addition,
C.F. Crocker, the vice president of the Southern Pacific Railroad, was listed as a holder of Miller’s
code but used a different and inferior confidentiality code [3]. A comparison of two of the three
known extant copies of Miller’s codebook casts doubt on my conclusion.1
Most telegraph codebooks had a list of blank extra words; Miller’s was no exception, but his
was unusual (Figure 1). I wrote:
Miller, by contrast, provided about 20 pages of pair-wise lists of extra words; each
such page was intended for correspondence with a different individual. This clearly
shows his orientation towards point-to-point communication, rather than one-to-many
or many-to-many. Any realistic use of one-time pads would indeed require point-to-
point messaging.
However, the New York Public Library’s copy is different: it has a conventional list of extra
words (Figure 2). Clearly, there were two different printings or editions; this is unlikely to have
happened for a book that was never used.
It is uncertain which version is older, though it seems likely that the Library of Congress has
the original one because of the requirements of the copyright law of the time: new works were
required to be deposited within 10 days of publication [7]. This copy has a copyright stamp dated
September 12, 1882, consistent with the reviews published a month later. Furthermore, the NYPL
copy has an extra list of recipients. Miller would not have wanted to delete a list like that; if nothing
else, it was good advertising, as well as more assurance of the utility of the codebook.
On the other hand, it is hard to understand why the separate point-to-point lists of extra words
would have been deleted in favor of a single list. Possibly, customers did not understand the point,
though even that would argue that there was a customer base.
1 The University of Chicago copy is in poor condition and I have not seen it. However, inquiries via the librarian
suggest that it is similar to the Library of Congress copy; in particular, it does not have the extra list of recipients.
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Figure 2: The extra-word list in the New York Public Library’s copy of Miller’s book.
At least two publications [1, 2] carried reviews of Miller’s book. The New-York Tribune’s
review quite rightly focused on the security aspects of his code:
He has devised therefore a scheme in which the meaning of the arbitraries [sic] is
continually shifting. There is nothing new in that; but he has improved upon his pre-
decessors by contriving not merely that the meaning of the ciphers shall be variable,
but that the key for translation shall also vary with every word. A fortunate guess at
the meaning of part of a dispatch would give no clew, in this system, to the meaning
of the rest, nor any help in reading other dispatches between the same persons.
The review spoke of the additives as “chosen at random,” even though Miller himself never used
that word.
The article went on to say, “Obviously it is impossible to translate this cipher without the list
of shift-numbers [additives], and so long as that is kept safe the system seems to afford absolute
security” (emphasis added). It concluded, “We have examined a great many codes and this is the
safest with which we are acquainted.” It is fair to doubt that a general newspaper’s telegraph code
reviewer was an expert cryptanalyst (and the level of cryptologic knowledge in the U.S. at the
time was quite pitiful); still, the reviewer did grasp the essence of Miller’s scheme’s confidentiality
properties.
The other known review, in the Banker’s Magazine and Statistical Register, is shorter and
focuses somewhat more on the “test words”—authentication codes—in Miller’s scheme. It does
speak of security: “a feature which seems to render impossible forgery, or deciphering by any one
except the correspondent holding the key” (emphasis added). It did not explain the cryptography
as clearly as did [2], but instead pointed to Miller’s own article [10].
4 Conclusions
If Miller’s codebook was more secure than anything else and wasn’t ignored, why did it fade into
obscurity? Why was the concept of random, never-reused additives lost for more than 35 years?
There are three reasons.
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First, as Kahn notes, codebooks succeeded or fell based on both extrinsic and intrinsic factors
[9]: “The extrinsic factor is the salesmanship of the compiler, and this often outweighs everything
else.” Miller was a banker, not a telegrapher or a code compiler; if he didn’t actively market his
system, it was bound to be replaced by something else. Second, it arguably wasn’t a very good
codebook; there are too many individual words and too few phrases. Miller himself wrote of
“the system of ‘packing’ long sentences each into one representative word, so as to save expense
in ‘cabling’” [10]. In an era when codebooks were important enough that general circulation
newspapers like the New-York Tribune deemed them worthy of book reviews (and this review was
in a column along with a number of books aimed at general readers), there would have been many
other choices.
Third, though, one-time pads are very hard to use in practice. Absent a serious threat model—
and absent a clientele that had sufficient knowledge of cryptology to understand its advantages—
the one-time pad was probably a disadvantage. There was probably a cryptologic problem—Miller
wrote that the “deciphering [cryptanalysis] of important messages has been common, and some-
times has produced serious results. Among businessmen the topic is of daily importance”—but in
the many-to-many world of bank transactions, one-time pads were probably the wrong solution.
Governments could have used it, but the U.S. government was notoriously bad at cryptology.
The new information is interesting for the light it sheds on what Miller knew, and on whether or
not his codebook was actually used. His understanding of the threats and of his system’s security
were deeper than had been supposed.
Miller’s threat model goes a long way to explaining his desire for non-repetition and hence non-
reuse. Additives were not new; they go back to the very first telegraph codebook [13]. However,
the combination of reuse of an additive, repeated use of a codeword, and the probable plaintext he
assumed would be available did add up to a threat, one that was exacerbated because the commer-
cial codebooks of the day were generally one-part. Still, Miller took an unprecedented step beyond
the common practice of using a repeating sequence of numbers, a notion that was proposed quite
early [13]. The newly discovered documents do not shed any light on what led him to this insight.
Miller’s use of modular arithmetic is less surprising. Anyone trying to use additives in the real
world would encounter the question of how to encrypt the last few entries; wrapping around is
the obvious answer (though [13] had a more convoluted scheme that would have led to ambiguous
decryptions). For example, Slater’s 1870 confidentiality code [12] said, “where the result exceeds
25000 [the size of his codeword space], deduct that number, or, in other words, commence the
alphabet again.” Bloomer, in 1874, also realized this, though his solution was less clearly expressed
[6]:
To put the above sentences into a cipher word, it may be done by the sender adding,
and the receiver deducting, or by the sender deducting, and the receiver adding; that
is, counting a certain number of words forward or backward. . . To deduct from the first
part, the last numbers will furnish the balance, and to add to the end, the first words
will be the continuation.
The motivation for the randomness requirement remains quite unknown. It is a subtle point;
the need for it is clearest to cryptanalysts, and there is as yet no evidence for Miller having any
background in the subject. That said, this plus his concern about probable plaintext attacks does
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suggest some familiarity with cryptanalysis, either from his military background or perhaps from
his conversations with the Sacramento Wells, Fargo agent and their concerns about rogue telegraph
operators [4].
Finally, I also have no new information on whether or not Miller’s ideas reached Mauborgne,
perhaps via Parker Hitt. From a historical perspective, this is probably the most important question.
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